

$\textbf{Temposonics}^{\circledR}$

Magnetostrictive Linear Position Sensors

SAFETY MANUAL TH – SIL 2 Capable




Table of contents

1.	Introduction	2
2.	Risk analysis	2
	System design	
	3.1 Redundant design without internal diagnostic	2
	3.2 Redundant design with internal diagnostic	
	3.3 The safety function	
4.	Device specific notes	
	4.1 Determination and intended use / certification	3
	4.2 Mechanical and electrical installation	3
	4.3 Operating and offline proof tests	3
	4.4 Maintenance and repair	3
	4.5 Illegal and safety critical operation modes	3
	4.6 Common cause failure	4
	4.7 Measures against foreseeable misuse	4
	4.8 Fault failure action plan	4
	4.9 Product identification	
5.	T-Series Analog Safety	4
	5.1 Functional description	4
	5.2 Offline proof test-method for checking the safety function	4
	5.3 Safety tolerance	5
	5.4 Certification and failure rate data	
6.	Terms and abbreviations	6

1. Introduction

This manual provides to the user electrical installation and operation guidelines for the Temposonics® T-Series models with analog output in safety related applications. The T-Series model is SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 2 certified according to IEC 61508.

IEC 61508	Functional safety of electrical / electronic /
	programmable electronic safety-related systems

2. Risk analysis

IEC 61508 SIL	MTTF _d	High Demand Mode PFH
3	high, 30 < 100 years	$\geq 10^{-8} \text{ to} < 10^{-7}$
2	med, 10 < 30 years	$\geq 10^{-7} \text{ to} < 10^{-6}$
1	low, 3 < 10 years	$\geq 10^{-6} \text{ to} < 10^{-5}$
No special requirements	-X-X-	$\geq 10^{-5} \text{ to} < 10^{-4}$

Fig. 1: Probability of dangerous failure

3. System design

3.1 Redundant design without internal diagnostic

A redundant design is one in which two sensors, each with an independent output (reverse output operation) are put into place. The validation of the function is performed by a cross-comparison where the correct output of 2 signals of one sensor is defined as:

If this necessary result is not received, the controller interprets a system fault and places the system into the emergency stop.




Fig. 2: Redundant design without diagnostic

Without internal diagnostics of the channels, the system is not able to detect which channel has failed. The controller is busy with the comparison algorithm and its processing capacity will be reduced.

3.2 Redundant design with internal diagnostic

Sensors with internal self-diagnostic capability enable a failure message independent from the controller processing loop. The sensor itself will place itself into the fail safe state.

In this case the controller is able to separate the channels and the system can enter into a safe operational mode, where the machine is able to continue performing the function with one channel operation until the failed sensor gets replaced.




Fig. 3: Redundant design with diagnostic

3.3 The safety function

The T-Series Safety sensor will continuously output a position signal proportional to the magnet position, and the internal diagnostic function will check safety relevant parameters within the hardware. The sensor will report an output error signal in the event of a failure. The control unit (ECU) receives the provided signals. In the event of a failure the ECU must react in an appropriate manner in order to manage the emergency function. The system will shut off or operate in emergency mode.

T-Series Analog Safety	
Current output	420 mA
Error output	< 3.6 mA

Fig. 4: T-Series output function

Failure types

- 1. Safe Failures (λ_{SD} and $\lambda_{\text{SU}})$ detected and undetected
- 2. Dangerous Failures (λ_{DD} and λ_{DU}) detected and undetected IEC 60079-14 and local regulations.

Type of failures (λ) within safety related systems					
Fail State	Detected	Undetected			
Fail Safe	$\lambda_{\scriptscriptstyle{SD}}$ Safe Detected	$\lambda_{\scriptscriptstyle{\text{SU}}}$ Safe Undetected			
	The sensor will run without any command from the controller into the safe state.				
Dangerous Fail	λ _{DD} Dangerous Detected: The sensor runs into a dangerous state (= inoperative function)	λ _{DU} Dangerous Undetected: The sensor is not able to run into a safe state.			

Fig. 5: Failure types

4. Device specific notes

4.1 Determination and intended use / certification

The T-Series Safety model is a magnetostrictive linear-position sensor certified according to IEC 61508 for single input in low demand mode and high demand mode, SIL 2 safety instrumented systems. The sensor measures the relative position of a travelling magnet relative to its NULL position. The output signal is transmitted to an external controller (ECU) and processed according to its requirements.

4.2 Mechanical and electrical installation

No special or additional sensor installation requirements exist beyond the standard installation practices documented in the actual T-Series operation manual. Environmental operating specifications are applicable as published in the specifications section in the T-Series operation manual (document no. 551513).

4.3 Operating and offline proof tests

For complete information regarding performance, installation, operation, and specifications of T-Series Safety models, refer to our operation manual (document no. 551513). All normal installation recommendations as documented in the operation manual for T-Series analog sensors are applicable. All configurations are allowed for the T-Series Safety models. Functional tests of safety relevant circuits will give a reliable statement about all components in use (sensor, controller and acting device). The user is responsible for applying proof test (check interval is 1 year).

4.4 Maintenance and repair

The T-Series Safety models are not field repairable; device repairs must be performed by MTS. All terminal faults which are not followed by 10 consecutive startups without terminal faults must be reported. In the event of a failure contact MTS Sensors.

4.5 Illegal and safety critical operation modes

All operating modes outside given specifications are not allowed. The specific limits are valid and they shall not be exceeded. Especially the operation manual needs to be considered. No firmware changes are permitted nor authorized. The sensor should be replaced if a storage temperature of 93 °C is ever exceeded. In order to assure the safety values in fig. 7, the sensor should be replaced if the operating temperature exceeds the indicated value.

4.6 Common Cause Failure (CCF)

The following CCF issues have been considered in the design of the T-Series sensor models and can be used in overall system CCF analysis:

- 1. The sensor is protected against overvoltage, up to max. voltage rating, and miswiring (VDC GND).
- 2. The FMEDA is available and the results of the FMEDA were taken into account for CCF analysis.
- The designers of this sensor have been trained to understand the causes and consequences of common cause failure.
- 4. The sensor has been tested for: EMC (emission and immunity), mechanical loads (e.g. vibration, pressure), environmental influences like fluid ingress and temperature. The sensor is compatible within these environments and is intended to be used in these conditions provided it remains sealed against contamination from these environments.

4.7 Measures against foreseeable misuse

The measures that have been taken against the foreseeable misuse of the T-Series Safety are:

- 1. Full protection against miswiring of the sensor.
- 2. Detailed instructions in the operation manual on methods to prevent damage to the sensor during installation.
- Checking the function of the sensor after installation will mitigate the possibility of undetected damage to the sensor during the installation process.

4.8 Fault failure action plan

In the event the sensor exhibits a terminal fault response, the sensor must operate without a subsequent terminal fault (i.e. the sensor does not output a current less than 3.6 mA) for 10 consecutive starts following the initial fault response. Otherwise, the sensor must be returned to MTS Sensors for inspection.

4.9 Product identification

The T-Series sensor is offered in numerous configurations that vary in length, flange type, connection type, explosion protection and output. The model number of the sensor includes the character "S" in position 14 to indicate approval for SIL 2. All versions with the "S" option for functional safety are SIL 2 capable.

5. T-Series Analog Safety

5.1 Functional description

The T-Series Analog Safety position sensor is classified according to IEC 61508 type B having a hardware fault tolerance of 0. The sensor performs self-diagnostics and enters a fail-safe state upon the detection of a failure, indicating the safety function cannot be performed. For the sensor output to be considered valid, value must be in the range 3.8...20.5 mA for 10 consecutive milliseconds. If the sensor output value ever lies outside of 3.6...21 mA, and therefore in a fault condition, the fault condition shall be considered present until the output is in the valid range for 10 consecutive milliseconds. The active measurement range is 4...20 mA (for the defined stroke of sensor).

Online proof test

The conditions that will trigger a fault are:

- · Missing or damaged position magnet
- Invalid checksum of parameter memory
- Invalid checksum of program memory
- Internal hardware failure
- Magnet position is outside the valid measuring range

5.2 Offline proof test-method for checking the safety function

The offline proof test can be applied in order to check the safety function of the sensor.

Within the offline proof test recommended functional tests:

The safety function of the T-Series Safety sensor is internally checked but the diagnostic coverage of the sensor can be increased by checking the function of the sensor externally.

The recommended method for checking the function of a T-Series Analog Safety is:

- 1. Bypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip.
- 2. Set the T-Series to its zero position.
- 3. Move the T-Series sensor's position magnet through its full stroke length to its full-scale position to confirm full range of motion.
- 4. Return the T-Series to its zero position.
- 5. Perform a 3 point calibration verification of the T-Series over the full working range.
- 6. Remove the bypass and restore normal operation.

All applied methods and results of the proof test have to be written in a test report. When the functional test is negative, the device and the system need to be shut down. The process has to be kept in a safe mode due to appropriate actions. Please pay attention to the valid technical literature: operation manual (electrical operation and installation, document no. 551513).

5.3 Safety tolerance

Review the T-Series operation manual (document no. 551513) for the operating accuracy of the sensor. The safety accuracy of the T-Series analog sensor is 1 % of full stroke. An example of the calculations necessary for determining the maximum safe position of the sensor magnet is as follows:

Full stroke: 80 mm

Magnet speed: 100 mm/sec Worst-case response time: 10 ms

Safety tolerance = $1 \% \times 80 \text{ mm}$ = 0.8 mm

Response time tolerance (if moving)

- = 100 mm/sec × 10 ms
- = 1.0 mm

5.4 Certification and failure rate data

The failure rates are from the FMEDA generated following IEC 61508. The following assumptions are valid:

- The sensor operates in low demand mode and high demand mode.
- Failure rates of external power supplies are not considered.
- Refer to FMEDA-report for mentioned SFF and PFD_{avg} values.
- The T-Series analog sensor will enter a fail-safe state in the event of a failure.
- The controller device needs to interpret the failure signal in the correct manner.
- The ambient conditions follow the specifications out of the valid operation manual (document no. 551513)
- PFD value is calculated assuming a 1-year proof test interval.

Failure rates assume useful lifetime of components are not exceeded. The useful lifetime is defined as an operational time interval where failure rate is relatively constant.

T-Series (SIL 2: Analog Safety)	IEC 61508
Safety level	SIL 2
Device type	В
MTTF _d	100 years @ 60 °C; 44 years @ 80 °C
PFD _{avg}	3.49E-04 @ 60 °C; 9.85E-04 @ 80 °C
Diagnostic response time (Fail Detection Time)	25 ms (max) 1 sec for CRC fault detection
% of SIL 2 range for PFD	3.5 % @ 60 °C; 9.9 % @ 80 °C
Hardware fault tolerance (HFT)	0
Useful lifetime	50 years @ 60 °C; 18 years @ 80 °C

Fig. 6: T-Series parameters

Device @ 1 % accuracy	$\lambda_{ extsf{SD}}$	$\lambda_{_{SU}}$	$\lambda_{ exttt{DD}}$	$\lambda_{ extsf{DU}}$	SFF
T-Series @ 60 °C	0	100	802	62	93.6 %
T-Series @ 80 °C	0	283	2266	175	93.6 %
T-Series @ 85 °C	0	400	3205	248	93.6 %

Fig. 7: Safety values for maximum operating temperature

6. Terms and abbreviations

Cat. Safety category according to EN 954-1 E/E/PE Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic FIT Failure In Time (1×10-9 failures per hour) FMEDA Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (analytical method for determining failure modes and failure rates) FSM Functional Safety Management HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance, HFT=x where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function. High demand or continuous mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF _d Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD _{avq} Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type B "Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) or the combination of Integrity Requirements Specificat	Term	Specifications
FIT Failure In Time (1×10-9 failures per hour) FMEDA Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (analytical method for determining failure modes and failure rates) FSM Functional Safety Management Hardware Fault Tolerance, HFT=x where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function. High Demand Mode High demand or continuous mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD Pom Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System — Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is		
FMEDA Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (analytical method for determining failure modes and failure rates) FSM Functional Safety Management HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance, HFT=x where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function. High Demand Mode High demand or continuous mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand mode Operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD Nog Probability of failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Instrumented System — Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A Component "Non-Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B Component The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	E/E/PE	Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic
FSM Functional Safety Management HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance, HFT=x where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function. High Demand Mode High demand or continuous mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD Post Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Infection of any combination of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	FIT	Failure In Time (1×10-9 failures per hour)
HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance, HFT=x where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function. High Demand Mode High demand or continuous mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	FMEDA	(analytical method for determining failure modes and failure rates)
where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function. High Demand Mode High demand or continuous mode is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF _d Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD _{avg} Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	FSM	Functional Safety Management
frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year. Low demand Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF _d Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD _{avg} Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is		where x is the number of faults that the design can tolerate without losing its safety function.
mode operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. MTTF _d Mean Time to Dangerous Failure PFD _{avg} Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation The demonstration for each phase of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) on the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	_	frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per
PFD avg Probability of Failure on Demand PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is		operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than
PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	MTTF _d	Mean Time to Dangerous Failure
PFH Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	PFD _{avg}	Probability of Failure on Demand
of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action. SIF Safety Instrumented Function SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is		Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour
SIL Safety Integrity Level SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	SFF	of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined
SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A component "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B component "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	SIF	Safety Instrumented Function
of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of device(s), logic solver(s) and final element(s). SLC Safety Lifecycle Type A "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	SIL	Safety Integrity Level
Type A component "Non-Complex" component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B component "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	SIS	of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of
component elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2 Type B	SLC	Safety Lifecycle
component or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2 V&V Verification and Validation The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is		elements); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of
Verification The demonstration for each phase of the life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is		or programmable logic); for details see
life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis and/or testing. Validation The demonstration that the safety-related system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	V&V	Verification and Validation
system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is	Verification	life-cycle that the (output) deliverables of the phase meet the objectives and requirements specified by the inputs to the phase. The verification is usually executed by analysis
	Validation	system(s) or the combination of safety-related system(s) and external risk reduction facilities meet, in all respects, the Safety Integrity Requirements Specification. The validation is

lotes	
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_
	_



Document Part Number:

551504 Revision A (EU.EN) 01/2015

OCATIONS

GERMANY MTS Sensor Technologie GmbH & Co. KG Auf dam Schüffel Q

Auf dem Schüffel 9 58513 Lüdenscheid, Germany Tel. +49 2351 9587-0 Fax +49 2351 56491 info.de@mtssensors.com www.mtssensors.com

MTS Systems Corporation Sensors Division

3001 Sheldon Drive Cary, N.C. 27513, USA Tel. +1 919 677-0100 Fax +1 919 677-0200 info.us@mtssensors.com www.mtssensors.com

JAPAN MTS Sensors Technology Corp.

737 Aihara-machi, Machida-shi, Tokyo 194-0211, Japan Tel. +81 42 775-3838 Fax +81 42 775-5512 info.jp@mtssensors.com

FRANCE MTS Systems SAS

Zone EUROPARC Bâtiment EXA 16 16/18, rue Eugène Dupuis 94046 Creteil, France Tel. +33 1 58 4390-28 Fax +33 1 58 4390-03 info.fr@mtssensors.com www.mtssensors.com

ITALY MTS Systems Srl.Sensor Division

Via Diaz,4 25050 Provaglio d'Iseo (BS), Italy Tel. + 39 030 988 3819 Fax + 39 030 982 3359 info.it@mtssensors.com

www.mtssensors.com

CHINA

MTS Sensors

Room 504, Huajing Commercial Center, No. 188, North Qinzhou Road 200233 Shanghai, China Tel. +86 21 6485 5800 Fax +86 21 6495 6329 info.cn@mtssensors.com

EGAL NOTICES

MTS and Temposonics® are registered trademarks of MTS Systems Corporation. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Printed in Germany. Copyright © 2015 MTS Sensor Technologie GmbH & Co. KG. Alterations reserved. All rights reserved in all media. No license of any intellectual property rights is granted. The information is subject to change without notice and replaces all data sheets previously supplied. The availability of components on the market is subject to considerable fluctuation and to accelerated technical progress. Therefore we reserve the right to alter certain components of our products depending on their availability. In the event that product approbations or other circumstances related to your application do not allow a change in components, a continuous supply with unaltered components must be agreed by specific contract.







